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DELEGATING PEACE ENFORCEMENT
MISSIONS—BUT TO WHOM?
WHAT THE U.N.’S RECENT
RECOMMENDATION REVEALS ABOUT
TODAY’S CRISIS IN LEGITIMATE ACTORS FOR
ROBUST PEACE OPERATIONS
Karima Tawfik *

Introduction
On June 17, 2015, under the instructions of Secretary General Ban Kimoon, the United Nations (U.N.) reviewed its peace operations and
submitted its findings to member states. The report, titled “Report of the
High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our
Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership, and People,” recommends—
among an array of other reforms—that the Security Council move away
from authorizing peace operations conducted entirely through the U.N. and,
instead, delegate peace operations in situations of sustained armed conflict to
non-U.N. actors, such as regional organizations and ad hoc coalitions of
1
member states.
This recent recommendation by the U.N. panel is a symbol of today’s
crisis in peace operations, which arises from the lack of legitimate actors to
conduct robust peacekeeping missions—that is, those peace operations
2
conducted in “environments with no peace to keep” or in “situations of
3
violent conflict and in the absence of a viable peace process.” In such
instances of sustained armed conflict, the U.N. has increasingly authorized
* J.D., December 2015, University of Michigan Law School. Winner of the Michigan
Law Review First Impressions Writing Competition 2016. I would like to thank Professor
Monica Hakimi for her guidance on this Essay and for her course, the Use of Force in
International Law, which provided the subject-matter background on peacekeeping missions.
1. Rep. of the High-Level Indep. Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths
for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People, para.118, U.N. Doc. A/70/95-S/2015/446 (June 17,
2015) [hereinafter Rep. of the High-Level Indep. Panel].
2. Id. at 12; see also Mateja Peter, Between Doctrine and Practice: The U.N.
Peacekeeping Dilemma, 21 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 351, 356 (2015) (“[T]he Security Council
is increasingly becoming more willing to deploy peacekeepers where there is no peace to
keep.”).
3. Rep. of the High-Level Indep. Panel, supra note 1, at 43.
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“offensive force,” such as targeted offensive operations to “degrade,
5
neutralize or defeat an opponent,” in missions that are “increasingly bearing
6
a resemblance to the stabilization missions in Afghanistan and Iraq.”
According to Mateja Peter, such U.N. peace operations are “erasing the line
7
between peacekeeping” —that is, those missions that seek to maintain a
secure environment, deter the resumption of violence, provide a secure space
8
for the advancement of the political process, and protect civilians —and
“peace enforcement”—missions that enforce political solutions through
9
offensive use of force (such as target combat operations) and without the
10
consent of all parties to the conflict.
This Essay argues that in assessing whether or not to move towards the
U.N. panel’s proposed model that champions regional actors and ad hoc
coalitions over the U.N. itself, the international community must weigh the
marginal costs and benefits of this plan. This essay follows the U.N. panel’s
11
call for the international community to derive lessons from the past by
examining three case studies where regional actors and ad hoc coalitions,
rather than the U.N., have embarked on peace enforcement missions. It
argues that if the international community chooses to follow the U.N.
panel’s recommendation on deferring to regional actors or ad hoc coalitions,
it should prepare for fewer peace enforcement operations, of shorter
duration, and at times motivated by regional politicking. The international
community should also be aware that the benefits of the panel’s
recommendation—swift and decisive action and a somewhat increased
ability for the U.N. to adhere to its principles of consent, impartiality, and
nonuse of force—will be counter-balanced by fewer controls on regional
actors’ profiteering and human rights abuses and a lack of guarantee as to
the length of the mission.
The analysis proceeds in two parts. First, the Essay will examine the
proposed method’s impact on the U.N.’s ability to return to defensive and
impartial tasks in the midst of conflict, that is, the likelihood that the U.N.

4. Id. para. 121.
5. Id.
6. Peter, supra note 2, at 352.
7. Id.
8. See Rep. of the High-Level Indep. Panel, supra note 1, para. 106.
9. Peter, supra note 2, at 352–54, 360.
10. Id. at 358. (“UN peacekeeping operations are supposed to be deployed with the
consent of the main parties to the conflict. This distinguishes them from enforcement
operations . . . [C]onsent is missing in contemporary operations, mainly because
comprehensive peace agreements are lacking.”)
11. Rep. of the High-Level Indep. Panel, supra note 1, para. 133.
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will satisfy its principles of consent, impartiality, and nonuse of force
following other actors’ interventions. Then, the Essay will evaluate the
proposal’s impact on other metrics of successful peace enforcement
operations: the ability to enforce peace swiftly, in conformity with
international human rights and laws-of-war principles, and with adequate
12
capacity to bring an end to hostilities.
To control for variables that may lead to more difficult peace
enforcement challenges, this Essay only tracks peace enforcement operations
where the host state’s government invited a regional organization or ad hoc
coalition to conduct the peace enforcement operation. This analysis will
draw upon operations by the Economic Community of West African States
in Sierra Leone and Liberia, by the Southern African Development
Community in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Lesotho, and
by an ad hoc coalition of francophone African countries, Mission
Interafricaine de Surveillance des Accords de Bangui, in the Central African
Republic. This Essay focuses on these operations because they represent
some of the few peace enforcement operations executed outside the auspices
of the U.N. and with the invitation of the host state’s government.
I. Ad Hoc Coalitions and Regional Actors as First Responders:
Protecting the U.N.’s Role in Defensive and Impartial Tasks?
In her recent article on the U.N.’s peacekeeping dilemma, Mateja Peter
describes the classic peacekeeping doctrine as one in which the U.N. plays a
role in “defensive and impartial tasks” such as protecting civilians and
13
supporting post-conflict processes and mediation. This model reflects the
basic principles of U.N. peacekeeping as developed through the Brahimi
14
15
Report and the “Capstone Doctrine” : consent, impartiality, and nonuse of
12. This Essay evaluates only the panel’s recommendation to defer robust peace
operations to regional actors or ad hoc coalitions; it does not seek to evaluate the many
beneficial recommendations that the panel discusses at length in its report, such as ensuring
that the U.N. uses its convening power to prevent and mediate conflict and to assist in political
solutions, Rep. of the High-Level Indep. Panel, supra note 1, at 10–11, that it create a rapid
response U.N. team to establish initial mission presence and to reinforce missions in crisis, id.
at 13, and that it move away from U.N. Headquarter–focused policies toward a field-focused
administrative framework. Id. at 15.
13. Peter, supra note 2, 366–67 (2015).
14. The Brahimi Report, Rep. of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, U.N.
Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (August 21, 2000) [hereinafter Brahimi Report], named after
Lakhdar Brahimi, the Chair of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, was
unanimously adopted by the Security Council on November 13, 2000, and contained
recommendations regarding peacekeeping operations. “Brahimi Report”: Report of the Panel
on
United
Nations
Peace
Operations
(2000),
UNITED
NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/brahimi_report.shtml
[https://perma.cc/YUD8FAUR]. The report was a culmination of efforts by the U.N. to assess the shortcomings of the
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force (except in self-defense). As Peter describes, U.N. peacekeeping
operations are supposed to be deployed with these three principles because,
in the absence of consent, impartiality, and nonuse of force principles, a
17
U.N. peace operation might struggle to carry out its basic functions, present
18
itself as a neutral party in peace negotiations, or maintain legitimacy
19
among local populations.
Yet, U.N. peace operations have recently forfeited such principles for
more robust peace-operation mandates, as described by the U.N. panel and
20
Peter. The U.N. panel stated in a 2015 report that “[t]oday, several United
Nations missions are effectively being called upon to undertake a conflict
21
22
management role” and to conduct “stabilization” missions that “support
23
the extension or restoration of State authority.” Peter describes the Security
Council’s move away from the traditional model in spring 2013, when it
expanded the mandate of the peacekeeping mission in the DRC to include
offensive combat. Specifically, the Security Council authorized a “force
intervention brigade” within the existing U.N. Organization Stabilization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) mission
structure to push back the Tutsi March 23 (M23) militia in the east and
directed U.N. peacekeepers to assist Congolese forces in fighting armed
24
groups. These directives explicitly compromise the U.N.’s historically
impartial role. As Peter states, “the types of activities that U.N. peacekeepers
are mandated to perform imply that the U.N. is engaged in a battle in
coalition with the Congolese government, the same government that the
U.N. and other international actors have repeatedly criticized for condoning
25
serious abuses by its military against civilians.” As the DRC mission

U.N.’s then-existing peace operations that had led to the failure of the U.N. to prevent
genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and to protect the inhabitants of Srebrenica in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 1995. Id.
15. In 2008, the U.N. released the Capstone Doctrine, U.N. Secretariat, Dep’t of
Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and
Guidelines, (2008) [hereinafter Capstone Doctrine], which outlined the most important
principles and guidelines for U.N. peacekeepers in the field.
16. Brahimi Report, supra note 14, para. 48; Capstone Doctrine, supra note 15, at 31.
17. Peter, supra note 2, at 358.
18. Id. at 364.
19. See id. at 360.
20. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text.
21. Rep. of the High-Level Indep. Panel, supra note 1, at para. 113.
22. Id. para. 114.
23. Id.
24. Peter, supra note 2, at 354.
25. Id.
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demonstrates, the robust U.N. mandate threatens to compromise U.N.
credibility in the eyes of civilian populations and on the international stage.
Why did the U.N. move toward engaging in partial actions on the
international stage? The U.N. panel stated in a 2015 report that while it is
“convinced of the importance” of the core principles, “[a]t the same time,
the Panel stresses its concern that the principles of peacekeeping should
never be used as an excuse for failure to protect civilians or defend the
26
mission proactively.” The panel noted the U.N.’s “determination to
respond even-handedly to the actions of different parties” to the conflict and
ultimately calls for a “flexible and progressive interpretation of U.N.
27
principles.” These statements seem to demonstrate that the panel is torn
between its capacity constraints and its sense of obligation in instances
28
where there are “obvious aggressors and victims,” such as the Rwandan
genocide or the massacre of civilians at Srebrenica, which led to the
29
adoption of a more robust peace enforcement mandate in the first place. In
promoting a greater role for non-U.N. actors in carrying out peace
operations, the U.N. panel appears to seek some type of third option to
ensure a response to protect civilians during ongoing hostilities while
simultaneously retreating to more modest peacekeeping mandates.
So could ad hoc coalitions of member states and regional organizations
provide the best of both worlds by proactively protecting civilians in the
midst of ongoing hostilities and preserving the U.N.’s role as an impartial
body that can focus on peacekeeping, post-conflict assistance, and
humanitarian aid? Through the examples below, this Essay examines
whether ad hoc coalitions of member states and regional actors acting as the
first responders to conflicts in the past have preserved this aspirational role
of the U.N. This Section aims to shed light on whether or not deferring to
such actors will increase the U.N.’s conformity with the peacekeeping pillars
of consent, impartiality, and nonuse of force, as the U.N. panel hopes. This
Section gleans lessons from the interventions of the Economic Community
of West African States in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the Southern African
Development Community in the DRC, and the ad hoc Mission Interafricaine
de Surveillance des Accords de Bangui coalition in the Central African
Republic.
All of these interventions by ad hoc coalitions and regional
organizations present a more nuanced picture of the likelihood of insulating
the U.N. from the negative aspects of peace operations. Concerning the
goals of remaining impartial and of laying the foundation for all parties to

26.
27.
28.
29.

Rep. of the High-Level Indep. Panel, supra note 1, para. 125.
Id.
Id. para. 126.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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the conflict to consent to U.N. presence, for example, consider the U.N.
intervention in Sierra Leone. The Economic Community of West African
States played a combat role in the Sierra Leonean war for two years, until
the war came to a close with the formation of the Lomé Peace Accord in
July 1999 between President Ahmad Kabbah and the Revolutionary United
30
Front (RUF) rebels. Nevertheless, all parties to the Sierra Leonean conflict
still did not consent to the next phase of peacekeeping and peace-building. In
October 1999, the U.N. created the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
(UNAMSIL), a mission intended to facilitate the implementation of the
31
Lomé peace agreement. But in “UNAMSIL’s baptism of fire” in May
2000, the RUF killed several U.N. personnel and prevented the deployment
32
of UNAMSIL to the eastern provinces of the country. Seeking to use their
leverage to weaken the Sierra Leonean state, RUF rebels held 500 U.N.
33
troops hostage, and seized their heavy weapons and vehicles. One account
posits that the rebels were “seeking to exploit the vacuum created by the
departure of Nigerian [i.e., Economic Community of West African States–
34
affiliated] peacekeepers from Sierra Leone.” Although the U.N. refers to
UNAMSIL as a success story in peacekeeping, that “may serve as a model
35
for successful” operations, the transition from the Economic Community of
West African States operation to the U.N. mission in Sierra Leone does not
demonstrate a neat picture of first responders paving the way for consent and
nonuse of force by U.N. troops. In fact, it was not until 1,200 British troops
arrived in Sierra Leone to protect Freetown, provide much-needed back up
36
to UNAMSIL, and arrest the RUF commander that the war came to an end.
It is true, however, that much of the ambivalence civilians felt toward
the Economic Community of West African States and its troops—which
30. See Adekeye Adebajo & David Keen, Sierra Leone in UNITED NATIONS
INTERVENTIONISM, 1991–2004 246, 257 (Mats Berdal & Spyros Economides eds., 2007).
Lomé made the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, vice-president and gave him the chairmanship of
the highly coveted Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources because “there
seemed few alternatives left for President Kabbah whose Nigerian protectors [referring to
Nigerian troops of ECOWAS] were withdrawing amidst lackluster international support for
Sierra Leone.” Id. at 257.
31. Sierra
Leone
UNAMSIL
Background,
UNITED
NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/background.html
[https://perma.cc/Q3RC-WMXP].
32. See Adebajo & Keen, supra note 30, at 261.
33. Id. at 261–62. The RUF commander also reportedly referred to the U.N.
peacekeepers as “paper tigers.” Id. at 262.
34. Id. at 261.
35. Sierra Leone - UNAMSIL - Background, supra note 31.
36. The takeaways from relying the British military, or other well-equipped militaries,
are discussed in more detail in Part II, infra.
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many regarded as heroes who saved their country from ruin, while others
37
saw the peacekeepers as a largely Nigerian army of occupiers —did not
transfer to perceptions of UNAMSIL, which has largely been regarded as
38
successful. UNAMSIL was able to “disarm[] and demobilize[] more than
75,000 ex-fighters, including child soldiers. . . . [and] helped organize Sierra
Leone’s first ever free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections by
39
providing logistics and public information support.” Thus, perhaps regional
organizations as first responders do protect the efficacy of later, more
modest U.N. peace operations. The proposition that the Economic
Community of West African States as the first responder wholly paved the
way for the U.N. to come into Sierra Leone on the basis of consent and
nonuse of force, however, is not rooted in the history of the initial transition,
which was far more volatile and contested.
The experience of the Southern African Development Community in the
DRC provides an example of how regional organizations may only
marginally increase the perceived impartiality of U.N. peacekeeping forces
that arrive after the conflict has come to a formal close through a peace
agreement. In response to an invasion from Rwanda and Uganda that they
feared would threaten the rule of President Laurent Kabila—who had come
40
to power in a coup against longstanding dictator Mobutu Sese Seko —
Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia sent their own troops to the DRC in
41
August 1998. After rebels backed informally by Rwanda and Uganda
began challenging the Kabila government, Kabila appealed to Southern
42
African Development Community leaders for assistance. In August 1998,

37.
38.

Adebajo & Keen, supra note 30, at 255.
See Ismail Rashid, Sierra Leone: The Revolutionary United Front, in IMPUNITY:
COUNTERING ILLICIT POWER IN WAR AND TRANSITION 191 (Michelle Hughes & Michael
Miklaucic eds., 2016).
39. Sierra Leone - UNAMSIL - Background, supra note 31.
40. See Thomas W. Lippman, As Mobutu Topples, U.S. Sees Potential for Similar
Problems,
WASH.
POST
(May
18,
1997),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/05/18/as-mobutu-topples-us-seespotential-for-similar-problems/bceb1cfd-915b-4837-94a3-190dde5727e3/
[https://perma.cc/TX5F-B6VS].
41. KATHARINA P. COLEMAN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND PEACE
ENFORCEMENT 116 (2007).
42. Mel McNulty, From Intervened to Intervenor: Rwanda and Military Intervention in
Zaire/DRC in AFRICAN INTERVENTIONIST STATES 173, 183–84 (Oliver Furley & Roy May
eds., 2001). Rwanda and Uganda were largely responsible for bringing Kabila to power just a
year prior. Id. at 179–82. But they grew disillusioned with the leader due to his “lethargic
administration” and his demand for all foreign forces to leave the DRC. Id. at 183. Rwanda
and Uganda began to create the Congolese Rally for Democracy in August 1998, which
included members of Congolese opposition groups, defectors from Kabila’s army, and
reinforcements from Rwandan and Ugandan forces. Id. at 183–84.
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President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe announced that the Southern African
Development Community would respond to Kabila’s requests for military
43
assistance. Meanwhile, Rwanda and Uganda stepped up their support of
44
rebels in the eastern part of the country. In the words of the Assistant
Secretary of State Susan Rice, the conflict in the DRC had become the “first
45
African world war.” By 1999, however, the DRC and five regional states
signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement to bring the conflict to a close. The
Security Council subsequently established the U.N. Organization Mission in
46
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).
MONUC arrived in the DRC after the Southern African Development
Community intervention, but its experience demonstrates the difficulty of
remaining impartial when it must rely on the host government to execute
even its modest peacekeeping and post-conflict objectives. When the first
MONUC observers arrived in country in November 1999, President Kabila
allowed them to travel to the eastern region around Lake Kivu, the hotbed of
rebel activity, but barred them from establishing posts in more government47
controlled regions. In response, Emile Ilunga—the chief of the Congolese
Rally for Democracy, a rebel group operating around Lake Kivu—declared,
“[t]he Lusaka process has been held to ransom by the international
community and Laurent Désiré Kabila . . . . There is complicity between
48
Kabila and the UN . . . .” Similarly, Joseph Kabila, who took over the
presidency after his father was assassinated, promised to “collaborate closely
49
with the UN,” while increasing arrests of civilian and military citizens of
50
51
Lake Kivu, continuing the state’s close ties to Zimbabwe, and ultimately

43. COLEMAN, supra note 41, at 120–21.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 121.
46. MONUC
Background,
UNITED
NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/monuc/background.shtml
[https://perma.cc/MG5K-22EZ].
47. GÉRARD PRUNIER, AFRICA’S WORLD WAR: CONGO, THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE,
AND THE MAKING OF A CONTINENTAL CATASTROPHE 247 (2009) (“When the first MONUC
observers were deployed in November 1999, they were theoretically allowed in Goma,
Bukavu, Kisangani, Gbadolite, Lisala, Pepa, Isiro, Kabalo, Bunia, Pweto, Bumba, Kalemie,
Moba, Kongolo, and Kindu. But they were explicitly barred from Mbandaka, Mbuji-Mayi,
Lubumbashi, Kananga, Matadi, and Kamina. This meant that Kinshasa accepted the MONUC
deployment on rebel territory but refused it on its own, particularly in the places where it had
fighting forces or where it handled military cargo.” (citations omitted)).
48. Id.
49. PRUNIER, supra note 47, at 258 (quoting Joseph Kabila, Democratic Republic of the
Congo Interim President, in his Inaugural Address on January 26, 2001).
50. Id. at 260.
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dragging his feet in allowing MONUC access to government-held sites for
52
disarmament programs.
The experience of the U.N. in the DRC shows that a regional actor’s
involvement as first responder does not necessarily pave the way for an
impartial, consent-based entrance of the U.N. Rather, the experience of the
DRC demonstrates that even after MONUC entered the country, the
Congolese government did not want the U.N. scrutinizing its activities. In
the face of government recalcitrance, the U.N. faced a difficult choice: either
enter DRC with the partial mandate of only assessing regions in rebel
53
control or refrain from peacekeeping altogether. Ultimately, it appears that
the U.N. chose the former. After 1.7 million deaths between August 1998
54
and April 2000, the ability to begin U.N. peace operations on the ground
appeared to be worth the U.N.’s necessary reliance on the autocratic Kabila
regime.
Certainly this account does not imply that the U.N. peacekeeping
mission was as partial as it would have been had the U.N. intervened at the
outset of hostilities in 1998. The aim of this Section was simply to show that
U.N. peacekeeping missions, even when intending only to enforce a peace
settlement, can still end up appearing partial in their mandates because of
their need to rely on the host government for consent to enter the country
and for logistical and other support. Thus, the U.N. panel’s proposal to
delegate peace enforcement to ad hoc coalitions of member states and
regional organizations will likely result in a marginal increase in U.N.
impartiality, but will not render U.N. peacekeepers wholly neutral because
of their inherent need to rely on the host government.
Furthermore, if the U.N. insists on delegating first responses to
outbreaks of war to ad hoc coalitions of member states or regional
organizations, then the international community must be willing to accept
that such actors often undertake such missions for their own particular
political motives, a fact that is in tension with the U.N.’s hope that its later
peacekeeping mandate will appear impartial to the host population.
Essentially, the U.N. will be delegating to regional entities—that are often

51. See id. at 269; see also INT’L CRISIS GRP., DISARMAMENT IN THE CONGO: JUMPSTARTING DDRRR TO PREVENT FURTHER WAR 12 (2001) [hereinafter DISARMAMENT IN THE
CONGO].
52. DISARMAMENT IN THE CONGO, supra note 51, at 13 (“These suspicions were
reinforced by the reluctance of the DRC government to provide information on the armed
groups to the Joint Military Commission or to MONUC, and its opposition to granting
MONUC access to the Kamina camps, where it claimed to have gathered Hutu fighters since
April.”); PRUNIER, supra note 47, at 269.
53. PRUNIER, supra note 47, at 246–49 (describing this predicament and subsequent
attempts at U.N. negotiations with the Kabila government).
54. Id. at 242.

10

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

[Vol. 115:1

led by autocrats themselves, like the Southern African Development
Community’s President Mugabe—that are willing to intervene on behalf of
oppressive governments. The U.N. would also be delegating without any
semblance of the carrots and sticks that it uses to promote good behavior by
the host state when the U.N. intervenes on the host state’s behalf. While
relying on regional organizations as first responders may preserve some
impartiality in the short-term, it is not clear how long a U.N. mission can
remain in country without, in practice, bolstering the state government.
Indeed, as Peter notes, the U.N.’s peacekeeping mission in the DRC has
morphed to support Joseph Kabila’s efforts to defeat rebels in the eastern
55
region surrounding Lake Kivu. This raises the question of whether such a
partial result was inevitable, regardless of the identity of the initial
responder.
Additionally, the framework that the U.N. panel proposes would be one
where “the Security Council should consider other actors . . . as more
56
appropriate first responders,” which begs the question: How willing is the
Security Council to endorse member state actions that are executed partially
due to that state’s interest in gaining regional influence? Peace operations
deplete intervening states’ resources and open those states up to criticism
should the mission go awry. The international community should expect that
a country like Nigeria or Zimbabwe will only volunteer to lead regional
interventions if it can justify those interventions to their domestic
populations as being in the national self-interest of the country. Zimbabwe
may have intervened in the DRC through the Southern African Development
Community in large part because of its ambitions to create an alliance
between Zimbabwe and the DRC that would provide a counter-balance to
57
South Africa’s regional dominance.
Thus, if the Security Council explicitly supports such regional actors by
delegating to them in Security Council resolutions, as the U.N. panel
suggests, would that not contradict other U.N. principles? According to
Peter, “[f]or the entire peacekeeping history, there has been a strong
reluctance to deploy peacekeepers to areas where they could be seen as
58
acting as instruments of their own governments’ policies.” The Security
Council endorsed neither the Economic Community of West African States’
55. See Peter, supra note 2, at 354–55.
56. Rep. of the High-Level Indep. Panel, supra note 1, para. 118.
57. COLEMAN, supra note 41, at 136 (“This agenda provided the context for
Zimbabwe’s decision to intervene in the DRC. The DRC could rival South Africa in
population and resources, though not in levels of development. After Kabila’s ascent to power
in 1997, therefore, Zimbabwe hoped for an alliance with the DRC that would help balance
South Africa’s regional dominance.” (citation omitted)).
58. Peter, supra note 2, at 355.
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interventions in Sierra Leone or Liberia nor the Southern African
Development Community’s intervention in the DRC. (In fact, the Security
59
Council urged all foreign powers to refrain from intervening in the DRC. )
This may demonstrate that the U.N. is uncomfortable deferring to regional
organizations in civil war interventions, because of its hesitation to support
either the host state’s autocratic regime or the expansionist interests of the
intervening state, or both. Of course, under international law, such Security
Council authorizations are not required for a regional or other actor to
60
intervene on a state’s behalf when the host state asks for such intervention.
But ad hoc coalitions of member states and regional organizations may be
more prone to respond to peace enforcement needs with the explicit backing
61
of the Security Council under its Chapter VIII powers —authorization that
the Security Council does not appear prepared to give.
This history indicates that while the U.N. panel appears to be ready to
“ruthlessly expose[]”its own shortcomings, including the absence of “fast62
deploying and interoperable forces,” it offers little assurance that the U.N.
will be willing to defer to ad hoc coalitions of member states or regional
actors in interventions that may be motivated by national interests in
exerting regional influence and that may often result in supporting an
autocratic government in its quest to enforce peace in response to
insurrection by non-state actors.
II. Other Metrics of Analysis: Command and Control, Conduct,
and Capacity
Assessing whether or not the international community should move to a
model that champions ad hoc coalitions of member states or regional actors
requires weighing the marginal costs and marginal benefits of other
important metrics of success beyond simply preserving the credibility of the
U.N. This Section will examine the proposed change’s likelihood of success
when examined under the metrics of increased command and control,
appropriate conduct in the field (i.e., refraining from human rights
violations), and the capacity to bring the conflict to an end.

59. Press Release, Security Council, Council Calls for Peaceful Solution to Conflict in
Democratic Republic of Congo, Including Immediate Ceasefire, Withdrawal of Foreign
Forces, U.N. Press Release SC/6569 (Aug. 31, 1998).
60. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
61. Id. at arts. 52–54.
62. Rep. of the High-Level Indep. Panel, supra note 1, para. 118.
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A. Command and Control
The U.N. posits that “other actors will more likely have the comparative
advantage in speed and capability, as well as in command and control
63
arrangements necessary to conduct sustained combat operations.” The
evidence of previous ad hoc coalitions of member states and regional actors
engaging in peace enforcement does support the proposition that such
missions are executed with increased speed and command and control. For
example, the Economic Community of West African States’ peace
enforcement operation in Liberia beginning in August 1990, when 3,500
West African soldiers deployed to halt an armed rebellion against President
64
Samuel Doe, came about through swift Nigerian leadership. Within eight
months of Charles Taylor crossing into Liberia to lead an armed rebellion
against Doe, the incumbent military leader, Nigeria’s military head of state
(and a personal friend of Doe’s) was able to martial Nigerian troops under
the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire
65
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to intervene. By October 1990, the
ECOMOG troops had taken control of Monrovia, effectively thwarting
66
Taylor’s coup attempt. (Notably, Nigeria was the largest contributor of
troops to ECOMOG around this period, supplying roughly 60 to 80 percent
67
of its forces between 1991 and 1997. ) This swift response supports the
argument that states and regional organizations, when motivated to do so,
can dispatch troops quickly to a volatile conflict zone.
Even ad hoc coalitions can be deployed swiftly. During the 1997 to
1998 intervention in the Central African Republic, the ad hoc Mission
Interafricaine de Surveillance des Accords de Bangui—composed of
Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali, Senegal, and Togo and financed by
France—was able to enter the country decisively despite its establishment
outside the framework of a regional organization. After the situation in the
Central African Republic significantly deteriorated in 1996, creating fear
that state collapse would exacerbate regional instability, these African
countries convened with French support in December 1996 and one month
68
later dispatched an inter-African force. The French government
“transported all six contingents to the [Central African Republic] within

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Rep. of the High-Level Indep. Panel, supra note 1, para. 118.
COLEMAN, supra note 41, at 73.
Id. at 75–76.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 82–83.
ERIC G. BERMAN & KATIE E. SAMS, PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA: CAPABILITIES AND
CULPABILITIES 222–23 (2000).
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days,” provided “logistical and tactical support on the ground,” and “paid the
69
total food and daily allowances” of all contingents. The unified command,
unity of language between the troops, and dependence on the French appear
70
to have provided the groundwork for this efficient operation. Remarkably,
the coalition was able to halt the rebellion and recover 96 percent of heavy
71
weapons and 60 percent of light weapons.
The Economic Community Of West African States and Mission
interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui command and control
structures are particularly appealing when contrasted with the U.N.’s slow
mobilization. Adekeye Adebajo and David Keen describe the U.N. troops
that replaced the Economic Community of West African States forces in
Sierra Leone as “a motley, multinational army—arriving bit by bit,
72
underfunded and lacking the necessary equipment.”
The U.N.
peacekeeping force in one city, for example, contained twenty-seven
73
different nationalities, all lightly armed, and unfamiliar with the terrain. In
sum, under the metric of command and control, decisive regional and ad hoc
coalitions present an attractive alternative to the slow pace of U.N. dispatch
and action, thereby supporting the U.N. panel’s proposal.
B. Conduct in Peace Enforcement
The U.N. panel is rightfully concerned about U.N. peace-enforcer
conduct when troops are deployed in volatile contexts with weak justice and
security structures. The report states,
[t]en years after the United Nations began systematically addressing it,
sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping operations are continuing, to
the enduring shame of the Organization, its personnel and the countries
which provide the peacekeepers who abuse. The deplorable acts of a few
74
must not be allowed to drag down the Organization. . . .

But delegating to ad hoc coalitions of member states or regional actors,
as the U.N. panel suggests, may further exacerbate these conduct problems.
In 1998, when rebel forces launched a brutal attack in Freetown in which
7,000 people were killed, the Economic Community of West African States
soldiers themselves began perpetrating significant abuses against civilians in
the city. Some authors note that such indiscipline may have grown out of the

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 226–27.
See id. at 225–26.
Id. at 224.
Adebajo & Keen, supra note 30, at 261.
Id.
Rep. of the High-Level Indep. Panel, supra note 1, at 14.
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poor pay and conditions of their troops (pay for Economic Community of
West African States troops is generally lower than that paid to U.N. troops)
and the troops’ perception of Sierra Leonean civilian “ingratitude” for the
75
regional organization’s sacrifices.
Additionally, during the Southern African Development Community
operation in the DRC, Zimbabwe established business interests to
compensate for the enormous expense of the operation. Zimbabwean
officials set up a joint venture with counterparts in the DRC to mine
diamonds, a deal with the DRC to gain millions of hectares in timber, and a
joint venture between Air Zimbabwe and the Congolese national airline for
76
aviation routes across the DRC. In addition, an elite network of
Zimbabwean officials obtained access to diamond, cobalt, copper, and other
77
mineral resource sectors. In 2002, the U.N. reported:
Although troops of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces have been a major
guarantor of the security of the Government of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo against regional rivals, its senior officers have enriched
themselves from the country’s mineral assets under the pretext of
arrangements set up to repay Zimbabwe for military services. Now ZDF is
establishing new companies and contractual arrangements to defend its
economic interests in the longer term should there be a complete withdrawal
78
of ZDF troops.

In Central African Republic, despite the otherwise successful operation
described in Part I, the Mission Interafricaine de Surveillance des Accords
de Bangui ad hoc coalition committed some serious human rights abuses, as
79
the U.S. State Department outlined in its 1997 country report. With the
U.N.’s acknowledgement of its own human rights abuses and retreat from
peace enforcement altogether, the international community must ask what
leverage the U.N. will have to condemn such breaches of peace-enforcer
conduct, and how much weight such condemnation will carry. The human
rights concerns arising out of regional interventions are a counterweight to
the benefits of increased command and control.

75. Adebajo & Keen, supra note 30, at 256.
76. DISARMAMENT IN THE CONGO, supra note 51, at 2–3.
77. Rep. of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Nat. Res. and Other
Forms of Wealth of the Dem. Rep. Congo, para. 22, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1146 (Oct. 16, 2002).
78. Id. at para. 17.
79. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1997
(1998),
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1997_hrp_report/car.html
[https://perma.cc/74BV-5877].
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C. Capacity
A serious drawback of the recommendation to defer robust peace
operations to ad hoc coalitions and regional organizations is that states are
often unwilling, absent explicit national benefits, to engage in peace
enforcement missions in the first place. The U.N. panel acknowledges this
issue when it states, “[F]or many crises in the world, those with the greatest
capability may have limited interest in deploying a sustained military
80
presence on the ground . . . .” As a result, it states that “the international
community has looked to deploy United Nations peacekeeping operations in
81
the midst of conflict as a crisis response tool.” Further, the panel
acknowledges that regional and sub-regional entities may “bring interests,
some of which carry potential risks to managing conflict impartially” to the
82
peace operation. The below Section examines case studies to show how the
benefits of insulating the U.N. from perceptions of partiality in conflict and
of swift and decisive actions by regional actors or ad hoc coalitions of
member states may be offset by the price of truncated or unsuccessful
missions.
France, for example, quickly grew flustered with the model used in the
Central African Republic when it realized that it would be the only Western
country bearing such a heavy financial burden (roughly US $600,000 per
month) to sustain the Mission Interafricaine de Surveillance des Accords de
83
Bangui mission. The French eventually threatened to withdraw, prompting
the U.N. to create its own peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Mission
in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) to replace the Mission
84
Interafricaine de Surveillance des Accords de Bangui in March 1998, just
fourteen months after its initial entry. As another example, British troops
only intervened in Sierra Leone after over a decade of brutal warfare,
500,000 Sierra Leonean casualties, and a direct attack on a U.N. mission
85
with the kidnapping of U.N. troops, as described in Part I. And Nigerian
leadership decided to pull out of Sierra Leone in May 1999 due to the mass
unpopularity of the campaign within Nigeria’s populace, which no longer
wanted to shoulder the burden of US $1 million per day in funds and
hundreds of deaths for the Economic Community of West African States
86
mission.

80.
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82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Rep. of the High-Level Indep. Panel, supra note 1, para. 108.
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Id. para. 55.
BERMAN & SAMS, supra note 68, at 226–28.
Id. at 227–28.
See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text.
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In fact, regional organizations are more susceptible to capacity
constraints than the U.N. Unlike the U.N. peacekeeping arrangement
whereby countries collectively fund troops, regional organizations rely on
their own members states’ funds and troops. The Southern African
Development Community, for example, has no effective mechanism for
promoting financial or military burden-sharing for peace enforcement
87
operations.
During the time of Southern African Development
88
Community’s intervention in the DRC and in Lesotho one year later, the
Southern African Development Community’s total annual budget was US
89
$16 million. South Africa spent US $4 million in the first ten days of the
90
Community’s operation in Lesotho alone. With member states incurring
the high costs of peace enforcement operations, it should be unsurprising
that national interests often govern the length of time that states are willing
to keep boots on the ground for peace enforcement operations.
Conclusion
The recent U.N. panel on Peace Operations report demonstrates a
current crisis in peace operations: the lack of legitimate actors to execute
peace enforcement missions. Peter lays the groundwork for discussing the
alternatives to the U.N. as peace enforcers when she notes that the U.N. and
member states must either “align the peacekeeping practice more closely
with the doctrine . . . [or] embrace new practices and provide for a new
91
strategic or doctrinal underpinning.” The U.N. panel’s inclination to protect
the U.N.’s credibility by ensuring viable peacekeeping operations that do not
exceed the bounds of the U.N.’s capacity is understandable. But the on-theground complexities of the current zones of ongoing violence require a
choice, whether to (1) deploy a cautious international force, (2) defer to an
ad hoc coalition of member states or a regional organization as the first
responders, or (3) pursue no peace enforcement operations at all. This Essay
has sought to show that the U.N. panel’s recommendations must be digested
not in the abstract, but rather, with an empirical study of the likely results of
deferring to ad hoc coalitions of member states and regional organizations. If
the international community chooses this option, it should prepare for fewer
peace enforcement operations, of shorter duration, and that will be at times

87. COLEMAN, supra note 41, at 169.
88. The Lesotho operation was actually led by South Africa, id. at 160, which had
opposed the Southern African Development Community incursion into the DRC. Id. at 126.
89. See id. at 126–27, 169.
90. Id. at 169–71.
91. Peter, supra note 2, at 366–67.
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motivated by regional politicking. While the operations that do occur will be
swift and decisive, they will have fewer controls on profiteering and human
rights abuses and no guarantees as to the length of the mission.

